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A BRIEF RETURN TO THE DIGITAL SAMPLING DEBATE
Introduction
In recent years, digital sound sampling has revolutionized the way
music sounds,1 and has introduced new methods of composition,
production, and performance.2 Concurrent with developing digital
technology, copyright owners have clamored to maintain their rights
in works of original authorship.3 On the one hand, artists who use
digital sampling claim the need for fair access to previously recorded
(and copyrighted) material; on the other, owners of copyright in the
sampled material struggle to enforce their copyrights against
potentially infringing digital sampling.
4
This tension has generated considerable discussion in legal
scholarship, inspiring professors, students and practitioners to weigh
in on both sides of the controversy.5 This note adds to the ongoing
debate and controversy surrounding digital sampling in the context of
contemporary popular music and copyright law. In particular, this
note addresses the narrow question of whether, in light of normative
American copyright principles, the fair use doctrine 6 should be
extended to cover creative works that use "transformative" 7 digital
samples.
Courts have counseled against such an extension. In Rogers v.
Koons,' the Second Circuit noted that "if an infringement of
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the
basis of the infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use-
1. See, e.g., David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More:" Sampling and the
"Autonomous" Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 608 (1992).
2. See id. at 608-09 (noting specifically that the relationship between composer and
computer programmer has been substantially blurred by the advent of digital sampling
technology).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (granting rights to creators in their original works of
authorship).
4. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Whose Rights? Sampling Gives Law a
New Mix, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 21.
5. See, e.g., Randy S. Kravis, Digital Sampling and Copyright, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231,
232 (1993) (noting that "[m]uch controversy has emerged over the new technology of
digital sampling."); Carl Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1994); William S. Coats & David H. Kramer, Not As Clean As They
Wanna Be: Intermediate Copying In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT
L.J. 607, 617 (1994); John Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16,1986, at C23.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
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without insuring the public awareness of the original work-there
would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense."9 The
Supreme Court echoed this idea in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.1° In holding that a parody could be protected under the fair use
doctrine, the Court warned that if "the commentary has no critical
bearing on the substance or style of the original composition,... the
claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes
accordingly .... 11
This note argues against the notion that extensions of the fair use
doctrine to "generally critical"' 2 expressive works would eliminate any
practical boundary to the fair use defense. Part I begins with
preliminary definitions and discussion of digital sound sampling, both
as a technological process and a cultural development. Part I then
argues that where a sample has been presented in a "transformative"
artistic context, such use is a legitimate tool of artistic expression. I
will support this argument by situating transformative samples within
the ambit of two contemporary socio-artistic sensibilities:
Postmodernism and a uniquely African-American aesthetic
paradigm-the "second sight."
Part II discusses the traditional normative goal of American
copyright law: achieving an equitable balance between protection of
original works of authorship and public policy considerations that urge
wide public access to creative works. 13 Part II also addresses some
uses of transformative digital samples in the context of relevant case
law and the fair use defense of the 1976 Copyright Act.14
In Part III, I argue that the boundary of the fair use doctrine, as it
currently exists in American jurisprudence, should be extended to
include additional forms of artistic criticism. In certain circumstances,
the goals of copyright law mandate permissive use of transformative
samples because the policy goals favoring public access to creative
expression outweigh the property interests of the copyright holder. I
9. Id. at 310.
10. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
11. Id. at 580.
12. By "generally critical" I mean a work that although possibly a parody, contains no
parodic reference to another original composition. In a footnote to the Campbell opinion,
the Court did note that a "parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody [in
Campbell] may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis of
parody." 510 U.S. at 580 n. 14.
13. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5
(Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT REPORT].
14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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conclude that, because of this balance in favor of wide distribution of
creative works, the goals of American copyright jurisprudence compel
the expansion of the fair use doctrine to include certain aesthetic




1. Technical Aspects of Sampling
Digital sampling is the "practice of using a portion of a previous
sound recording in the creation of a new recording."15 The process of
creating a digital sample can be reduced to three essential steps: a
digital recording; computer analysis and modification; and playback.1
6
Actualizing the first of these steps creates an "intermediate
copy"-an exact duplication of the original copyrighted recording.
17
This type of recording is similar to analog tape recording with one
crucial advantage; the digital sampler records and stores the
waveforms of the recorded sounds as a string of binary numbers,
allowing for exact reproduction. 8 During the second step of analysis
and modification, the sample might be "transformed" through the use
of various digital processing techniques.' 9 These techniques allow the
15. Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Case Makes Music Labels
Sweat, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 34.
16. See Kravis, supra note 5, at 237.
17. The creation of "intermediate" copies raises additional copyright infringement
issues beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion of the problems attendant to
intermediate copies, see Robert M. Symanski, Audio Pastiche: Digital Sampling,
Intermediate Copying, Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271 (1996). However, it is logical to
assume that if a court found the use of a transformed sample to be protected under the fair
use doctrine, then the prior creation of the intermediate copy would also be considered
fair. See Coats & Kramer, supra note 5, at 617; see also See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 142
(9th Cir. 1983) (itermediate copying of a play is not infringement if the ultimate work is
non-infringing). But see Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th
Cir. 1993) (creating intermediate copies to reverse engineer a computer program is
infringement, but excused as fair use).
18. See A. Dean Johnson, Music Copyrights: The Need For An Appropriate Fair Use
Analysis In Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 138 (1993).
19. Notice that this concept of "transformed" samples is rather different from the
"transformative" samples considered in this note. The former refers to manipulation of the
actual sound of the sample, while the latter refers to situating a sample in a novel creative
context. See infra Part I.B.
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sampling artist to modify the actual waveform (and thereby the sound
characteristics)2 ° of the sampled recording, or to truncate, repeat, or
splice it with other sounds.
21
Finally, the sample is "played back" in conjunction with other
musical elements, to create a novel musical arrangement. The length
of the average sample is short, usually between one and twenty-five
seconds.
22
2. Historical, Cultural and Creative Aspects of Sampling
The use of digital sampling in music traces its roots to the 1960's
in the Jamaican art form of "dub., 23 Equipped with mobile sound
systems, Jamaican disk jockeys ("D's") would produce live, mobile
discotheques, where they would mix together the previously recorded
works of various recording artists, and improvise lyrics over the
records.24 These live performances were eventually transferred to the
recorded medium by Jamaican producer/engineer King Tubby.
25
Dub was introduced to America in 1967 by Jamaican-born Kool
DJ Herc, who developed early sampling techniques along with
American DJ's such as Grandmaster Flash and Afrika Bambaataa.
26
However, these techniques, such as "scratching" a record in a single
groove to produce a percussive sound, were purely manual.27
In 1981, the MIDI synthesizer was introduced to the electronics
market, providing the potential for virtually endless experimentation
with digital technology and prerecorded source material. 28 The
introduction of this technology loosely coincided with the release of
the first rap music record to incorporate prerecorded music:
"Rapper's Delight" by the Sugar Hill Gang.29 Since the 1980's, rap
20. See H.P. NEWQUIST, MUSIC AND TECHNOLOGY 184 (1989).
21. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 138.
22. See Symanski, supra note 17, at 276 (citing E. Scott Johnson, Protecting Distinctive
Sounds: The Challenge of Digital Sound Sampling, 2 J.L. & TECH. 273 (1987)).
23. See Sanjek, supra note 1, at 610-11.




28. The essence of MIDI technology is the ability to record an analog signal as a
string of binary computer digits, and reproduce the sound at will into a new recording
context. See id. at 612.
29. "Rapper's Delight" was released in 1979, and borrowed from the prerecorded
song "Good Times" by the disco group Chic. Another rap album, the self-titled "Fatback
and their DJ, Big Tim III" was released the same year, and also borrowed from the Chic
recording. See Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don't Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:833
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music has relied heavily on the use of digital samples.30 More recently,
the use of digital samples has extended beyond the context of rap
music to a wide range of popular musical genres.
31
The prevalence of digital sampling in contemporary music has in
turn led to the advent of "mix tapes"-new recorded arrangements
that consist largely of previously recorded music.32 The popularity of
mix tapes parallels the increasing prominence of nightclub DJ's, who
often package and release recordings of their live nightclub
performances for sale at specialty record stores.33 The secondary
market created by mix tapes has further complicated copyright
infringement determinations. 34 Many record labels view mix tapes as
"'a form of promotion and marketing for the artist,' ' '35 and thus tacitly
sanction the distribution of mix tapes that feature the label's artists.
36
Conversely, the Recording Industry Association of America, a private
association of record labels and music publishers, has created an anti-
piracy unit to actively pursue and enforce copyright claims related to
mix tapes.37
B. Substantial Similarity and "Transformative" Digital Samples
For the purposes of this note, a "transformative" sample is a
sample that is "substantially similar" to the original source recording,
but has been placed in a novel creative context that differs
substantially from the original recording.
38
Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 767, 770-72 (1991).
30. See id.
31. Digital samples are widely used in rap, techno, industrial, and dance music. See
Symanski, supra note 17, at 279-80; see also examples listed in infra note 41.
32. See Billy Jam, Mastering the Mix: Dj's Are Making Hip-Hop Blends with a Whole
New Sound, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1997, (Datebook), at 34. Mix tapes often cull samples
from a wide range of sources. One mix tape by a San Francisco DJ includes samples from
the pre-recorded work of Led Zeppelin, Billy Joel, the Beach Boys, Queen, the Supremes,
and dialogue from various television shows and films, including "The Empire Strikes
Back." Id. at 35; see also Anita M. Samuels, New Urban Art Form, Old Copyright Problem:
A Music Industry at Odds on 'Mix Tapes,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at C8.
33. See Jam, supra note 32, at 35.
34. See Samuels, supra note 32.
35. Id. (quoting DJ Justo, National Director for rap and street marketing at
Atlantic/Big Beat Records).
36. See id.
37. See id. The anti-piracy unit recently confiscated 12,000 mix tapes from a New
Jersey record store, and routinely sends Cease and Desist notices to potentially infringing
parties. See id.
38. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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To make a successful case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff
must meet a two-part "substantial similarity" test. The plaintiff must
show: 1) that the copied portion of the allegedly infringing work bears
a "substantial similarity" to the original composition, and 2) that the
copied work constitutes an improper appropriation of the original
work.39
In determining whether a use of a substantially similar copy is
fair, courts look to whether, and to what extent, the new use
"transforms" the copied work. One articulated test for determining
when a transformative digital sample infringes a copyright is "whether
the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation
... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message;
[this test] asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative'."
40
For the purposes of this note, I will assume that the copied work
does in fact bear a substantial similarity to the original work. The
focus, then, will be on whether the copying was "improper
appropriation" of the original work, and whether the fair use doctrine
should excuse such copying as fair. Thus, we can assume that a
"transformative" digital sample is substantially similar to the source
recording, but has been transposed into a novel creative expression
with a substantially different character from the original work.41
C. Are Transformative Digital Samples Art?
1. The Postmodern Aesthetic-Pastiche
The use of transformative digital samples in novel creative
contexts can be considered an extension of postmodern aesthetics to
the creative medium of sound. For the purposes of this discussion,
"postmodernism" will be used to connote the emergent artistic
39. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.2 (1989).
40. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This test is
further discussed in infra Part 1.B.
41. Popular recordings that utilize transformative digital samples, as here defined,
include: PETER GABRIEL, SECURITY (Geffen Records 1982); PUBLIC ENEMY, FEAR OF A
BLACK PLANET (Def Jam/Columbia Records 1990); FISHBONE, THE REALITY OF MY
SURROUNDINGS (Columbia Records 1991); BEASTIE BOYS, CHECK YOUR HEAD
(Capitol/Grand Royal Records 1992); PORTISHEAD, DUMMY (Go! Discs/London Records
1994); FUTURE SOUND OF LONDON, ISDN (Astralworks/Virgin Records 1995); BECK!,
ODELAY (DGC Records 1996).
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sensibility that takes as its subject the intensification or abject critical
rejection of the modernist movement.42
In contraposition to "modernism," 43 the postmodern paradigm,
among its many ambiguous aims,44 rejects the notion that history is
necessarily coherent. Postmodernism is thus "the effort to take the
temperature of the age without instruments and in a situation in which
we are not even sure there is so coherent a thing as an 'age' or
zeitgeist or 'system' or 'current situation."' 45  Furthermore,
postmodernism advances the notion that the very idea of "culture"
has itself become a commodity, and the market has become as much
an article of commerce as those items it purports to contain.46
Within this postmodern paradigm emerges a new form of artistic
criticism, an analog of parody, or what Fredric Jameson calls
pastiche:
47
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique,
idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead
language. But [pastiche] is a neutral practice of such mimicry,
42. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM 107 (1991); Robert Dunn, Postmodernism: Populism, Mass Culture, and
Avant-Garde, 8 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 111 (1991); DAVID R. DICKENS &
ANDREA FONTANA, POSTMODERNISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 (1994). Dickens and
Fontana note that for some theorists:
postmodernism represents an intensification of the adversarial trends in modern
art characterized by a rejection of the norms and standards of the bourgeoisie. It
also represents an extension of these trends from a small circle of artists to a
much larger number of aesthetic elites who dominate the contemporary cultural
scene.
Id.
43. The famous Abstract Expressionist painter and art theorist Robert Motherwell
has noted that the Modernist movement is itself characterized by its rejection of earlier
institutionalized artistic paradigms (e.g. in painting, the institution of portraiture), and
beginning a project of investigating "what constitutes art as art:" which in turn leads to
increased subjectivity and abstraction. ROBERT MOTHERWELL, THE COLLECTED
WRITINGS OF ROBERT MOTHERWELL 259-60 (Stephanie Terenzio, ed., 1992). Thus, the
Modernist paradigm presupposes the existence of a novel but coherent hierarchical system
and mode of inquiry into the content of art, history, and culture. See id.
44. The term postmodernism has indeed suffered from multiple and ambiguous
definitions. See DICKENS & FONTANA, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that "[o]btaining a clear-
cut, common definition of [postmodernism] has proven to be extremely difficult ... not
only because of its interdisciplinary applications but also due to its diverse origins.").
45. JAMESON, supra note 42, at xi.
46. Id. at x ("Postmodernism is the consumption of sheer commodificaton as a
process.").
47. Id. at 16-17; see also Symanski, supra note 17, at 280-82.
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without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric
impulse, devoid of laughter.... Pastiche is thus blank parody.
48
Postmodern artists who use pastiche "often seek to critique and
refute the very idea that original creation exists in current commercial
society., 49 Thus, the postmodernist will appropriate banal cultural
artifacts and forms in developing her subject, to create work infused
with criticism of the postmodern, market-based society.
50
The relevance of pastiche to the use of transformative digital
samples is twofold: 1) both the postmodern artist's and the sampling
artist's statements inhere in the fact that a portion of the new work is a
copy of the original copyrighted work (i.e. sampled); and 2) the
sampling artist's statement would be wholly different in content were
the artist to play and re-record the original work instead of sampling it
from the copyrighted recording.
51
The implications of pastiche in the context of digital sampling are
thus apparent. No longer is the sampling artist necessarily a pirate or a
thief; the sampling artist has become a legitimate cultural critic, taking
part in a widely practiced socio-artistic movement. Further, creators of
mix tapes and other creative works that require digital samples are
expanding the definitional limits of music. This in turn benefits the
public at large by increasing the breadth and content of publicly
available creative works. If this is true, then the scope and contours of
48. JAMESON, supra note 42, at 17.
49. A. Michael Warnecke, Note, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The
Postmodern Art Challenge to the Copyright Law, 13 REV. LITIG. 685, 690-92 (1994) (citing
CORRINE ROBBINS, THE PLURALIST ERA: AMERICAN ART 1968-1981, at 1-2 (1984)).
50. For a decision discussing this mode of criticism, see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1992). In Koons, artist Jeff Koons created a series of sculptures entitled String of
Puppies that were modeled on plaintiff Rogers' photograph entitled Puppies. In asserting a
fair use defense, Koons argued that his sculptures were a parody of the commercial nature
of society at large, and he viewed the picture "as a part of the mass culture - 'resting in the
collective subconscious of people regardless of whether the [original photograph] had
actually ever been seen by such people."' Id. at 305. The court ultimately rejected Koons'
fair use defense in light of his apparent bad faith and abject disregard for the potential
rights of the copyright holder. See id. at 308-11. The Koons decision is further discussed in
infra Part III.B. See also JAMESON, supra note 42, at 272-73 (discussing the concept of the
market as a "social totality").
51. See, e.g., Symanski, supra note 11. Mr. Symanski further elucidates the conceptual
difference between reproducing the original work and sampling in the context of
postmodern painting. Painter Robert Rauschenberg, in a work entitled Persimmon, uses a
photographic reproduction of a portion of Rubens' Venus, which is then juxtaposed with
various other photographic themes. Mr. Symanski notes that "if Robert Rauschenberg
were to paint his interpretation of Rubens' Venus rather than appropriating a photographic
reproduction of it, he would be making a very different artistic statement." Id. at 288-89.
Rauschenberg's Persimmon is reproduced in id. at 286.
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copyright law should recognize the artistic and cultural value of this
form of expression, and consider permitting transformative digital
sampling of copyrighted works.
2. The African-American Aesthetic-the "Second Sight"
Transformative digital sampling has also emerged as one of the
principal tools in the development of rap and hip hop music.
52
However, as with postmodernism, the importance of digital sampling
in rap music extends beyond preliminary questions of novel
commercial exploitation, piracy, and misappropriation.53 Digital
sampling of pre-recorded sources supplies a substantive vehicle for the
continuing vitality of a uniquely African-American aesthetic
sensibility.
54
Digital sound sampling extends the context of the "vernacular"
(and inherently appropriationist) African-American/African-diasporic
aesthetic which "carefully selects available media, texts, and contexts
for performative use." 55 This aesthetic borrows sources from the
artist's experience of the surrounding world and incorporates these
sources in the generation of a novel and critical artistic expression.
56
The musical foundation of this aesthetic can be traced to Duke
Ellington compositions, such as "Harlem Air Shaft," which Ellington
explained as originating with his experience of Harlem:
You get the full essence of Harlem in an air shaft. You hear fights,
you smell dinner, you hear people making love. You hear intimate
gossip floating down. You hear the radio. An air shaft is one great
big loudspeaker. You see your neighbor's laundry. You hear the
Janitor's dogs. The man upstairs' aerial falls down and breaks your
window. You smell coffee .... An air shaft has got every contrast
52. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
53. See, e.g., Don Snowden, Sampling. A Creative Tool or License to Steal?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1989, (Calendar), at 61; Falstrom, supra note 5, at 359 n.2 (commenting that
many people are "more apt to equate sampling with theft than with borrowing.").
54. See Andrew Bartlett, Airshafts, Loudspeakers, and the Hip Hop Sample: Contexts
and African-American Musical Aesthetics, AFR. AM. REV., Dec. 22, 1994, at 639. The
framework of this aesthetic system is very similar to that of Postmodernism, as both
projects borrow general forms from the surrounding environment. However, whereas the
postmodernist employs common commercial symbology, an artist in the African-American
tradition herein discussed is generally motivated from the perspective of a historically
marginalized social group.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 641.
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.... You hear people praying, fighting, snoring .... I tried to put all
that in my Harlem Air Shaft.
Digital sampling has thus become an effective tool in revealing
the uniquely African-American "second sight:"58 "that process by
which the 'minority' knows the majority not only better than the
obverse, but often better than the majority knows itself., 59 Many
African-American artists inhabit a unique critical position, between
full acceptance into the mainstream culture, and full marginalization.
From this position, the artist, in attempting to construct discursive
definitions of both herself and her art, is often relegated to using the
artistic sensibilities developed in the mainstream pop culture. This
process itself has artistic content: the artist uses dominant mainstream
symbology to expose the definitional limits of the mainstream culture,
and simultaneously to suggest that her creative tools are limited to the
normalized mainstream modes of expression. Thus, for example, many
African-American rap artists use materials extant in the dominant
majority's world, often (copyrighted) products of the majority's idiom,
to further illuminate the contemporary African-American situation.
60
More specifically, the transformation of copyrighted music into
the rap medium has emerged as a tool for many rap artists to
"renegotiate the use of urban space."61 Artists such as Public Enemy 62
and Ice Cube63 often use appropriated samples from mainstream
57. Id. at 640 (quoting NAT SHAPIRO & NAT HENTOFF, HEAR ME TALKIN' TO YA:
THE STORY OF JAZZ AS TOLD BY THE MEN WHO MADE IT 224-25 (Dover 1966) (1955)).
58. This notion of the "second sight' originates in W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK (Bantam Classic ed. 1989) (1903):
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight
in this American world, - a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar
sensation, this double consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, - an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder.
Id. at3.
59. This definition of 'second sight' is given in Bartlett, supra note 54, at 640.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 647. The notion of sampling used in the contest over "public space" is
attributed to Tricia Rose, 'Fear of a Black Planet.' Rap Music and Black Cultural Politics in
the 1990's, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 276 (1991).
62. See, e.g., PUBLIC ENEMY, FEAR OF A BLACK PLANET (Def Jam/Columbia
Records 1990).
63. See, e.g., ICE CUBE, DEATH CERTIFICATE (1991); ICE CUBE, FEATURING... ICE
CUBE (1997).
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(copyrighted) culture in creating music with bifurcated political
content. Beneath the overtly "afrocentric" politicking of the lyrics, the
underlying music asserts a reclamation of urban space by
appropriating a piece of mainstream pop culture, subverting it, and
returning with a novel message wholly unintended by the original
recording artist.64
In essence, then, samples from copyrighted works become the
raw artistic material of many rap artists in their critique of a majority
culture that often excludes them. And, as with the postmodernists, the
fact that the sounds used in hip hop and rap music derive from other
sound recordings is essential to the intended artistic message. 65 If
transformative digital samples have become components to legitimate
contemporary artistic projects, it remains necessary to determine
whether the public benefit derived from free access to these
components outweighs the rights of a copyright holder.
II
The Law
A. The Goals of Copyright Law
Early in the history of contemporary copyright law, Congress
framed the statutory right to copy works of authorship as a balance
between producing incentive for authors to create original works by
giving them a property interest in those works, and the dissemination
of creative works for the benefit of the public. 66 In considering
copyright legislation, the Legislative Report on the Copyright Act of
190967 gave a fundamental articulation of these contravening rights:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the
author has to his writings ... but upon the grounds that the welfare
of the public will be served.
In enacting the copyright law Congress must consider . . . two
questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer
and so benefit the public, and second how much will the monopoly
granted be detrimental to the public? 68
64. See Symanski, supra note 17, at 287.
65. See Bartlett, supra note 48, at 640.
66. The interplay between these two interests, as it specifically relates to digital
samples, is discussed more fully in Part IV, infra.
67. 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-216 (1909).
68. H. REP. No. 2222, at 23 (1909).
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These two rights are not of equal import: "[t]he primary purpose
of copyright law is to foster the creation and dissemination of
intellectual works for the public welfare." 69 And, "the interests of
authors must yield to the public welfare where they conflict."7
The primacy of public welfare considerations is the essential
foundation of the American copyright system.71 Authors are only
allowed a property right in an original work to the extent that that
right gives the author incentive to create. When that right begins to
limit public access to works, the author's rights must be curtailed.
72
Accordingly, the American copyright system imposes certain
limitations and conditions on copyright protection. 73 One of the
principal limitations on copyright protection is the fair use doctrine.
74
Under this doctrine, certain uses of a copyrighted work are permitted,
because the social benefit derived from those uses outweighs the
potential interference with the author's incentive to create. Common
examples of fair uses include criticism, comment, news reporting, and
teaching.
75
B. Case Law and the Current Fair Use Regime
There is an apparent paucity of case law specifically relating to
digital sampling cases. This is due largely to the fact that most
controversies involving potential sampling infringement are settled
out of court, and thus do not provide specific factual scenarios from
which to synthesize a coherent doctrinal model.76 However, those
cases that are litigated generally involve lengthy discussion of the fair
use doctrine as a defense to infringement claims. Further, because the
fair use defense is a doctrine of equity, courts apply the defense on an
ad hoc basis.
77
69. COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
70. Id. at 6.
71. The American system can be contrasted with the European common law notion of
"natural rights." Under the natural rights approach, copyright law is designed to protect
the author's inherent, natural right to benefit from her own creation, and to control and
protect the integrity of the work as a natural extension of her personality. See, e.g.,
MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 355 (1995).
72. See COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
73. See id.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., David Browne, No Free Samples?, ENT. WKLY., Jan. 24, 1992, at 54.
(noting that many cases in the early 1980's, including suits involving rap artists De La Soul
and the Beastie Boys, were settled out of court).
77. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart
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In analyzing a fair use defense, the courts are guided by a four
factor test outlined in section 107. 78 Although these considerations
are not exhaustive, courts are to consider: 1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.79
The United States Supreme Court delimited these factors in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.8" There the Court decided that a
work of parody81 that utilized transformative digital sampling was
protected under the fair use doctrine and could therefore survive a
copyright infringement claim. 82 The plaintiffs in Campbell, the rap
group 2 Live Crew, used portions of the Roy Orbison song "Oh,
Pretty Woman" in their similarly-named parody "Pretty Woman."
83
The Court held that, because 2 Live Crew's use of Orbison's song was
a transformative parody of the original recording, the use was "fair"
within the meaning of Section 107.84
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the four-part fair
use test to determine that the public policy goals underpinning the fair
use doctrine outweighed the interests of the copyright holder, Acuff-
Rose Music. 85 The following discussion will analyze Campbell and
other cases, as well as the possible extension of the fair use defense to
other forms of criticism such as the postmodern mode of pastiche and
the African-American critical mode of second-sight.
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)) ("The fair use doctrine thus 'permits (and requires)
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."'); see also S. REP NO. 94-473, 62
(1975) ("[W]hether a use referred to in the first sentence of section 107 is a fair use in a
particular case will depend upon the application of the determinative factors.").
78. See 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
79. See id.
80. 510 U.S. at 577.
81. The Campbell Court defined parody, for the purposes of copyright law, as "the use
of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author's works." Id. at 580. For an excellent discussion of general issues
that surround parody and fair use outside the digital sampling context, see Richard Posner,
When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992).
82. 510 U.S. at 572.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 578.
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1. Purpose and Character of the Use
In permitting 2 Live Crew's use of the Orbison sample, the
Campbell Court stressed the importance of developing transformative
works: "the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright." 86 This line of
reasoning reversed the finding of the Sixth Circuit that "every
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively unfair."
87
Thus, while the commercial nature of the defendant's use may count
against a finding of fair use, that factor alone is not determinative. If a
work of parody is sufficiently transformative, sampling in a
commercial context may still be considered fair use.
The Court did note, however, that the parody must be aimed
specifically at the original composition. "If the parody has no critical
bearing on the substance or style of the original copyrighted
composition, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work
diminishes accordingly."88  In other critical contexts involving
transformative digital samples, this specificity requirement is
problematic. Artists who employ pastiche, or the second sight,
generally borrow samples from the mainstream culture as a whole,
seeking to critique the culture as a whole, without specific reference to
the corpus of the artist from whom they sample. Thus, under the
definition given in Campbell, these uses of digital sampling cannot be
properly considered parody.
89
However, section 107 does not provide an exhaustive list of the
types of criticism permitted under the fair use defense.9" Moreover, in
the Campbell decision, the Court effectively expanded that list to
include commercial parody. 91 Thus, there is no statutory preclusion of
pastiche or other forms of artistic criticism from fair use protection,
and the courts, in interpreting the fair use provision, could further
expand the ambit of the fair use doctrine to include additional types of
criticism. In essence, the courts are free to expand the scope of fair use
86. Id. at 579.
87. Id. at 584 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)).
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id.
90. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such
as criticism, comment, [and] news reporting ...is not an infringement of copyright.")
(emphasis added).
91. 510 U.S. at 572.
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protection, provided such expansion does not undermine the goals of
American copyright jurisprudence.
92
To determine the character of the use, courts also look to
evidence of good faith in the actions of the sampling artist. In
Campbell, 2 Live Crew adduced evidence that they were willing to
afford all credit of authorship in the original work to Acuff-Rose, and
were willing to pay a licensing fee for use of the sample.
93
Nonetheless, Acuff-Rose refused to allow the sample.
94
In contrast, the Second Circuit held in Rogers v. Koons, that artist
Jeff Koons acted in apparent bad faith when he removed the copyright
notice from copies of plaintiff's photograph. 95 There, Rogers sued
Koons for infringement for Koons' sculptures entitled "String of
Puppies" that were admittedly based upon Rogers' photograph
"Puppies."96 In the words of the court, "Koons' conduct, especially in
tearing the copyright mark off a Rogers notecard ...suggests bad
faith in defendant's use of plaintiff's work, and militates against a
finding of fair use."
97
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor involves an investigation into the nature of the
copyrighted work itself. In nearly all cases involving transformative
digital sampling, the sampled and copyrighted work is a sound
recording.98 However, the sampling artist arguably adds a substantial
creative element by choosing the content, placement and
modifications of the samples. 99 The copyright status of recorded
isolated sounds, such as a dog barking, is also unclear.
100
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
93. 510 U.S. at 572.
94. See id.
95. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). Fraudulent removal of a
copyright notice is punishable by up to a $2,500 fine. 17 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1994).
96. Koons, 960 F.2d at 301. Koons' claim of fair use of Rogers' photograph as a
parody was ultimately denied by the court for multiple reasons, including bad faith. Id. at
310.
97. Id. at 309.
98. Sound recordings are included in the protectable subject matter of copyright. See
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994).
99. See Symanski, supra note 17, at 316.
100. See Gregory Albright, Digital Sound Sampling and the Copyright Act of 1976: Are
Isolated Sounds Protected?, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 47 (1992).
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3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Courts are also guided by the amount and substantiality of the
sample as compared to the whole of the original composition. In
Campbell, the Court found that 2 Live Crew sampled "no more than
was necessary to 'conjure up' the original in order to parody it."1°1 In
contrast, the Koons court denied Koons' fair use defense because
Koons copied the whole of plaintiff's expression without attribution to
Rogers.112 Koons claimed that his sculptures were a parody of society
as a whole, and therefore protected under the fair use doctrine. 10 3 The
court rejected this argument, stating that "if an infringement of
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the
basis of the infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use -
without insuring the public awareness of the original work - there
would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense."'
10 4
This is the crucial distinction between the sampling in Campbell
and the copying in Koons. In Koons, because Koons copied Rogers'
photograph, there is no juxtaposition between Rogers' copyrighted
expression and Koons' asserted parody of it.105 In contrast, 2 Live
Crew sampled only the amount necessary to parody Orbison's original
work.0 6 2 Live Crew transposed a small portion of Orbison's song in a
new creative context, whereas Koons copied the whole of Rogers'
copyrighted photograph, or at least "much more than would have
been necessary" to parody Rogers' work. 10 7 Further, although the
Koons court did not discuss derivative works, it is very likely that
Koons' sculpture could be considered an unauthorized derivative
work of Rogers' photograph.
10 8
Although these distinctions hold in the comparative analysis of
the Koons and Campbell cases, the courts have not drawn any bright
101. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
102. 960 F.2d at 311 ("Here, the essence of Rogers' photograph was copied nearly in
toto, much more than would have been necessary even if the sculpture had been a parody
of plaintiff's work.").
103. See id. at 310.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 311.
106. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
107. Koons, 960 F.2d at 311.
108. The transposition of a photograph into a sculpture is within the statutory
definition of a derivative work: "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works such as a[n] ... art reproduction ... or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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line rules for determining the quantity or quality of copying required
to preclude a fair use defense. 10 9
In the context of transformative digital samples, courts will likely
find as a matter of equity that a particular use is not protected by fair
use if the sample is "of critical importance to the work as a whole and
taken by the infringer in order to save the time and expense incurred
by the copyright owner."11 Thus, an "atmospheric" transformative
sample added for texture would likely be fair use, whereas a more
fundamental and recognizable use, such as Run DMC's sample of
Aerosmith's "Walk This Way," would not.11
4. Impact of Use on the Potential Market for the Copyrighted
Work and Derivative Works
Finally, courts consider the impact of the use on potential
markets for the copyrighted recording. This factor has been called the
"single most important element of fair use." '11 2 In Campbell, the Court
noted that when the sampling composition is transformative, its effect
on the market for the original is uncertain, because "the parody and
the original usually serve different market functions." '113 The crucial
distinction is between "criticism that merely suppresses demand [for
the original work] and copyright infringement which usurps it." '114
The impact on the market for the original recording is
discoverable by inquiring into the target audiences of both the original
and the sampled work. In Campbell, this inquiry would take the form
of a comparison between the target audience of the Roy Orbison
recording of "Oh, Pretty Woman" and the target audience of 2 Live
109. See, e.g., Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rap recording artist Biz Markie held liable for infringement for using
a ten second digital sample of Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan's "Alone Again
(Naturally)," and repeating the sample in the background throughout his rap recording);
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983)
(verbatim copying of 29 words from a work of 2100 words is not fair use). But see Hustler
Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (copying of an entire work
is not a per se preclusion to a fair use defense).
110. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690
n.12 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Symanski, supra note 11, at
317.
111. See RUN DMC, Walk This Way, RAISING HELL (Def Jam 1986); Sanjek, supra
note 1, at 613.
112. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
113. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
114. Id. at 592 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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Crew's parody.115 Given the disparate character of the two recordings
and the fact that they serve "different market functions," it is
demonstrable that the effect on the original market would be
negligible."
6
Furthermore, it is arguable that use of a prerecorded sample may
in fact stimulate interest in the original work.'17 This line of argument
is supported by the apparent utility of mix tapes as "a form of
promotion and marketing for the [sampled] artist."1 18 Thus, many
record labels, at least tacitly, endorse the use of digital samples of
their artists in new works.
119
The impact of the sampling composition on the market for
derivative works tends to militate against the sampling artist. In
theory, the use of sampled work will revive interest in the original
recording, and the original artist may then want to cash in on this
interest by licensing samples to other artists.120 Consequently, an
expanded fair use paradigm would allow sampling artists to freely use
samples that otherwise would generate income for the original artist in
the form of licensing fees for derivative works. Unfortunately, no
evidence of derivative market harm was adduced in Campbell, and
thus the Court was silent on this point.' 2'
III
An Expanded Conception of the Fair Use Doctrine
A. The Balance of Competing Rights
Recall that "[t]he primary purpose of copyright law is to foster
the creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public
welfare,"' 22 and that "the interests of authors must yield to the public
115. The target audience could be ascertained by investigating the various marketing
strategies behind each recording.
116. 2 Live Crew submitted uncontroverted affidavits demonstrating the negligible
market harm to the original. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
117. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (noting that
distributed photocopies from books often generate interest in the original work); see also
Jeffrey H. Brown, They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To: The Legal Implications
of Sampling in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941, 1975 (1992).
118. Samuels, supra note 32, at C8; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. See Symanski, supra note 17, at 321.
121. The Court noted that "there was no evidence that a potential rap market was
harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parody, rap version." 510 U.S. at 593.
122. COPYRIGHT REPORT, supra note 13, at 5; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
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welfare where they conflict." '123 Thus, it is the goal of the Copyright
Act to provide authors incentives for the creation of expressive works.
However, if these incentives conflict with the public good, the rights of
the author must give way. In the context of transformative digital
sampling, the author's incentive has two components. First, it is
important to understand the creative incentive provided for the
musician who creates the original sampled work, and what derogation,
if any, judicially permitted sampling would have on this incentive.
Second, it is equally important to understand the incentive permissive
sampling has for the sampling artist: the incentive to create new works
using both novel technology and novel critical modes.
Allowing permissive sampling in contexts outside the current fair
use regime would not necessarily reduce the incentive for authors to
record original works, nor result in a significant reduction in the
creation of musical works.'24 For example, it is highly unlikely that a
musician writing songs today would be dissuaded from continuing her
project for fear that one day someone might sample a small, five-
second portion of her recording for his own uses. And, as the
Campbell Court noted, original works and the new transformative
works that utilize them "usually serve different market functions."
125
Furthermore, a comparatively small number of artists will ever have
their work sampled. 126 Additionally for those artists who license
sampling, licensing fees account for a relatively small portion of their
compensation. 127 Thus, the extension of the fair use doctrine to
include other transformative critical modes does not necessarily
present a substantial impact on the market for the sampled artist's
original recording.
It appears then that the only ascertainable disincentive for the
original artist is the loss of the ability to market derivative works.
Further, it is a well settled principle that "the licensing of derivatives is
an important economic incentive to the creation of originals."
128
However, the financial gains reaped from marketing previously
unimagined derivative works can amount to more windfall than
123. Id. at 6.
124. Symanski, supra note 17, at 326.
125. 510 U.S. at 593.
126. Symanski, supra note 17, at 327.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994); Mirage
Editions, Inc. v, Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989).
t998]
incentive. Thus, a more permissive framework for digital sampling
would not undermine the goal of American copyright law to provide
an incentive to create expressive and intellectual works.
On the other hand, a more permissive approach to digital
sampling would offer creative incentives to artists who utilize
transformative digital samples in their music. These sampling artists
could rely on access to prerecorded and copyrighted material without
the fear of litigation. This is not to suggest that the judiciary should
sanction wholesale piracy of copyrighted works. However, works that
contain sufficient "transformative value" as outlined in Campbell,129
but are not parodic of the original work, should be judicially
protected. Such a permissive regime would also expand public access
to works that utilize the critical modes of pastiche and second sight.
As argued above, these forms of criticism serve a valuable social
function by exposing traditionally under-represented elements of the
contemporary American socio-political situation, and by challenging
current definitional limits of mainstream music.13° Thus, as the
Campbell Court noted: "Like less ostensibly humorous forms of
criticism, [parody] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one." '131 Likewise,
critical modes such as pastiche -serve a valuable social benefit by
shedding light on society as a whole, while also presenting to the
public a novel creative expression.
B. A New Regime
Expanding the fair use doctrine to include critical modes such as
pastiche is consistent with the traditional goals of American copyright
jurisprudence. Section 107 does not provide an exhaustive list of the
types of criticism permitted under the fair use defense.132 Therefore, it
appears that Congress intended to leave open the category of criticism
protectable under the fair use doctrine. Thus, if presented with an
appropriate case, the courts are empowered to expand the fair use
doctrine to include other forms of transformative criticism.
Although a fair reading of the Campbell decision does not
provide for this extension, when viewed in light of traditional
129. 510 U.S. at 579.
130. See discussion supra Part I.C.
131. 510 U.S. at 579.
132. Recall that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, [and] news reporting ... is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1994).
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American copyright desiderata, the Campbell Court has paved the
way for judicial extension of the fair use doctrine. In the words of the
Campbell Court; "[t]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair uses doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright."' 33 The missing link
in the Campbell decision is judicial recognition of the critical value of
art forms such as pastiche and second sight.
The Campbell Court afforded fair use protection to parody
because a work of parody attaches itself to a specific prior work.'34
The critical difference between parody and modes of criticism such as
pastiche is the target of the criticism. Parody aims at a specific prior
recording, whereas pastiche aims at specific elements of society at
large. The Second Circuit in Koons illustrates the problem in
extending fair use to critical forms such as pastiche: "If an
infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use
solely on the basis of the infringer's claim to a higher or different
artistic use-without insuring the public awareness of the original
work-there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use
defense."' 35 However, this is not always true. The courts can draw ad
hoc lines based upon the four-part fair use test and upon principles of
equity. For example, a derivative work based upon the whole of the
copyrighted expression, such as Koons' copying of Rogers'
photograph, would not be a protected fair use. A work that is
sufficiently transformative, and that incorporates relatively smaller
portions of the copyrighted recording would be protected as a fair
use.
136
133. 510 U.S. at 579.
134. Id. 580 ("If.. .the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of
the original composition, ... the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work
diminishes accordingly.")
135. 960 F.2d at 310.
136. The crucial element here is the extent to which the work is transformative. Courts
have often held that copying relatively small but quintessential portions of the total
copyrighted work is sufficient to support an infringement claim. See, e.g., Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that verbatim copying of
300-400 words from President Ford's 200,000-word memoirs is sufficient to expose
defendants to infringement liability); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that taking 55 seconds from a one
hour, 29 minute film is infringement). However, to reiterate, such ad hoc determinations
are based upon specific findings relevant only to specific factual scenarios. Neither of the
defendants' works in Harper nor Roy Export was highly transformative, and the Campbell
Court stressed that the more transformative the work, the more copying may be justified.
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The point that underlies this analysis is the comparative social
value of parody and pastiche. As argued above, both pastiche and the
second sight serve useful and beneficial social functions. Therefore,
arguably, the public good derived from allowing artists to take
advantage of powerful critical modes outweighs the property interests
of the copyright holder. In short, critical modes such as pastiche and
the second sight are effective and beneficial to the public, and should
thus be protected under the aegis of copyright law.
IV
Conclusion
The use of digital sampling in contemporary music has
revolutionized the music industry. Attendant to this revolution are
difficult and complex legal issues that do not lend themselves to easy
resolution. In order to situate the use of digital samples within the
American copyright system, it is useful to understand the value of
such samples as an emergent musical art form. This note has argued
that, in many cases, the use of digital samples to produce novel and
transformative compositions exposes elements of contemporary
society, and thereby expands our understanding of both musical
composition and construction, and society as a whole. Thus, the
permissive use of transformative digital samples is an important,
useful, and beneficial public good.
In analyzing the traditional goals of the American copyright
system, the value of transformative sampling can often outweigh the
contrary goal of providing authors with an incentive to engage in the
creation of original works. Although a more permissive approach to
transformative digital samples will limit copyright owners' property
interests in their sound recordings, such a limitation is not likely to
result in any substantial disincentive to produce and record original
works of authorship. Therefore, a more permissive approach to
transformative uses of digital samples is consistent with, and indeed
mandated by, the purposes and goals of American copyright
jurisprudence. As such, the courts, given the appropriate conflict,
should expand the scope of the fair use doctrine to recognize the
social value of emerging and transformative art forms such as pastiche
and the African-American second-sight.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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